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ABSTRACT
The proposed paper summarizes a recent (August 2009) workshop at the
NASA Johnson Space Center discussing lessons learned from traverses, driven
largely by science objectives, in the Earth’s polar regions. These lessons will be used
as one facet of NASA’s preparation to explore, over extended periods of time, the
surface of the Moon and Mars as part of the Constellation Program. Over 50 years of
extensive traverses in both the Arctic and Antarctic provide a potentially rich source
of lessons for future planetary missions under analogous conditions.
For both lunar and Mars missions it is anticipated that both crew and robotic
equipment, which could arrive on different vehicles, will land in a fairly benign
location. But “benign” can also translate into “uninteresting” from a scientific or
exploration perspective, resulting in the crew exhausting the scientific potential of a
particular site before returning to Earth. This is especially true for Mars mission
crews who will spend 18 months at a given location. By providing a capability to
move long distances across the surface removes the need to risk a landing at a more
challenging, but interesting, surface location.
The proposed paper summarizes the workshop presentations and discusses
several of the key findings or lessons including: (1) A recognition that NASA’s
current approach for long duration planetary surface operations has fundamental
differences from any of the operational approaches described by the invited speakers.
These approaches drive the crew size and skill mix to accomplish basic objectives
and, in turn, drive the logistical pyramid needed to support these operations. NASA
will review the operational approaches of the organizations represented to understand
the differentiating factors. NASA will then decide if it should alter its current
approach to surface exploration. (2) There are potential parallels between key
characteristics of the systems used for exploration in these environments, such as
heated volume as an analog for pressurized volume or energy usage for various
activities. NASA will look at these characteristics to identify which could help with
preliminary planning and gather raw data from the presenters to model these
characteristics. (3) New technologies are being applied and design approaches are
being tailored to take advantage of these technologies on both side. Interactions
between these two communities has begun or is expanding to understand how these
new technologies are being leveraged: NASA habitation designers are exchanging
ideas and approaches with the Antarctic station designers; Antarctic support
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contractors have put together a list of areas where NASA could benefit from their
experience and vice versa; discussions have begun to compare the equipment used for
the NSF South Pole Station resupply traverses to identify possibly functional
similarities for NASA.
Introduction
Extended surface traverses by human explorers on other planets has been an
element of many of the planned and actual missions in this modern era of space
exploration. Wernher von Braun, in his book The Mars Project (von Braun, 1962),
envisioned his crew of human explorers landing on the (presumed) smooth icy planes
of the Mars polar regions and then traversing to the equatorial regions (a distance of
some 7000 kilometers) to set up their rockets for ascent back to their waiting Earth-
return spacecraft. The details for this book were being prepared during the early
1950’s at a time when many nations were resuming their exploration of Antarctica.
This including one group of Norwegians, Swedish, and British scientists who had just
completed a two-year expedition to this continent, a period of time roughly equivalent
to the time spent on the surface of Mars in this notional mission. (We will return to a
discussion of this group later in this paper.)
Since this plan was put forward by von Braun there have been several actual
traverses on the surface of the Moon, totaling approximately 95 kilometers by 12
individuals accumulated in six separate Apollo missions, as well as numerous other
plans of varying levels of detail for both shorter and longer traverses on the Moon and
Mars. NASA is now actively examining how surface traverses will contribute to its
overall direction for human spaceflight, namely to “establish a program to develop a
sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program to
promote exploration, science, commerce and U.S. preeminence in space, and as a
stepping stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations” (Congress of the
United States, 2005). During this same 60 year period over 130 separate scientific
traverses accumulating tens of thousands of kilometers of travel distance several
hundred individuals has been accumulated in the Antarctic (Anon., 2004, p.2-7
through 2-10). And this does not include numerous resupply traverses by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and other countries that maintain inland stations.
Given this reservoir of data and lessons regarding surface traverses in very
challenging environments, this paper discusses a workshop convened a the NASA
Johnson Space Center to discuss lessons learned from traverses, driven largely by
science objectives, in the Earth’s polar regions. We anticipated that these lessons
could help shape how similar traverses will be conducted by NASA and others on the
lunar and Martian surfaces. There was general agreement by those representing both
sides of this interaction (i.e., the polar traverse side and the planetary surface traverse
side) that there were lessons to be learned by both sides but there is more work yet to
be done in order to communicate and determine how best to take advantage of these
lessons.
The remainder of this paper will cover three main topic areas. First will be a
discussion of the current thinking within the NASA human spaceflight community
regarding planetary surface traverses. While this topic currently involves both lunar
and Mars missions, it will be Mars missions that are described in some detail given
the authors’ greater familiarity with Mars surface missions. The second topic area
will be a description of the surface traverse workshop held at the NASA Johnson
Space Center on August 4-6, 2009 along with some additional background
information regarding three of the Antarctic surface traverse discussed at the
workshop. The final topic area will be a discussion of the observations and key
lessons learned resulting from this workshop along with plans for carrying this
investigation forward into gathering more detailed data from traverses in the Earth’s
polar regions along with the analyses that are planned for these data.
Mars Surface Traverse Options
Candidate surface sites will be selected based on the best possible data
available at the time of the selection, the operational difficulties associated with the
site, as well as the collective merit of the science and exploration questions that can
be addressed at the site. Data available for site selection will include remotely
gathered data sets plus data from any landed mission(s) in the vicinity plus
interpretive analyses based on these data.
Figure 1 illustrates a notional series of traverses to features of interest at the
junction of the Isidis Planatia and Syrtis Major regions. No particular preference is
being given to this site; it is included here to illustrate some general features of a
human exploration mission and the resulting implications for operations at such a site.
From an operational perspective, this location has a relatively broad, relatively
flat, centrally-located area where the cargo elements can land in relative safety.
However this places these systems and the crew at large distances from those features
that are of interest to the crew and the science teams. The scale at the lower right
indicates that these features of interest are beyond what is currently considered a
reasonable walking range for the crew (determined by the distance a crewperson can
walk during one charge of power and breathing gases in their portable life support
system – roughly 15 kilometers total). Although sites with much more closely space
features of interest are certainly possible, they are usually found at the expense of a
relatively safe landing site. Thus a nominal set of traverses for any of the first three
human Mars missions are likely to be on the order of 100 kilometers radial distance
from the landing site, and based on several notional sites including the one shown in
Figure 1, these traverses could be much longer than the simple 200 kilometer round
trip.
Three possible approaches to satisfying this desired combination of horizontal
and vertical exploration were created during this Reference Architecture assessment.
These three options, given the working titles of “mobile home”, “commuter” and
“telecommuter”, were constructed to focus on different approaches to accomplish
these two exploration “directions”. It is recognized that there are other combinations
and permutations of these basic functions that could also satisfy these high level
goals, but given the time and resource constraints of this Reference Architecture
assessment, only these three were examined. An overview of each will be discussed
in the next several paragraphs.
The “mobile home” surface mission scenario assumes that surface
exploration by the crew will be primarily a mobile operation. Thus this scenario
assumes the use of two (for mutual support) large, capable, pressurized rovers for
extended traverses, spending between two and four weeks away from the landing site
(see Figure 2). These rovers will have space and resources allocated for on-board
science experiments. The landing site is assumed to have those infrastructure
elements not needed for the extended traverses, such as consumables, spare parts, and
a large power plant. The processing capacity of this ISRU plant is TBD and
dependent to a certain degree on the assumed implementation for the rover power
source (assumed to be nuclear). The landing site will be the “pantry” for food and
other basic maintenance and repair capabilities as well as storage for consumables
and a large power plant. As such the landing site has minimal crew habitation
capabilities. With this division of functions among the surface systems, it is assumed
that the crew will make a number of traverses away from the landing site, but return
periodically to resupply and refit the rovers before deploying on the next traverse.
In addition to the internal science experiments mentioned above the
pressurized rovers will also bring along two small robotic rovers, two unpressurized
(but small – comparable to the Apollo Lunar Rover Vehicle, LRV) rovers to carry
EVA crews, and a drill. The two robotic rovers can be teleoperated from the
pressurized rover or can be given a set of instructions and allowed to carry out these
instructions in an automated fashion. The unpressurized rovers will allow the EVA
crews to move relatively quickly between sites within walk-back range of the
pressurized rovers once the latter have stopped for extended operation at a given
location (it is assumed that the pressurized rovers will not be very nimble and thus
will serve as a “base camp” from which local traverses will be staged).
The “commuter” surface mission scenario (see Figure 3) assumed a centrally
located, monolithic habitat, two small pressurized rovers, and two unpressurized
rovers (roughly equivalent to the Apollo Lunar Rover Vehicle). Power for these
systems will be supplied by a nuclear power plant previously deployed and used to
make a portion of the ascent propellant. Although traverses will be a significant
feature of the exploration strategy used in this scenario, these traverses will be
constrained by capability of the small pressurized rover. In this scenario, these rovers
have been assumed to have a modest capability, notionally a crew of two, 100
kilometers total distance before being resupplied, and no more than one week
duration. Thus on-board habitation capabilities will be minimal in these rovers.
However these rovers are assumed to be nimble enough to place the crew in close
proximity to features of interest (i.e., close enough to view from inside the rover or
within easy EVA walking distance of the rover). Not all crew will deploy on a
traverse, so there will always be some portion of the crew in residence at the primary
habitat, permanently located at the landing site.
The primary habitat will have space and resources allocated for on-board
science experiments. The pressurized rovers will carry only minimal scientific
equipment deemed essential for field work; samples will be returned to the primary
habitat and its on-board laboratory for any extensive analysis.
In this last case, the “ telecommuter” scenario, it is assumed that the crew will
be based in a centrally located, monolithic habitat and only unpressurized (lunar rover
equivalents) rovers will be used for local, short duration EVAs. This implies
traverses by the crew of no more than walk-back distances (approximately 15
kilometers radial distance). The long range traverses will be handled by very capable
robotic rovers (notionally a considerably improved MSL rover) teleoperated (or
possibly supervised) by the surface crew from their habitat (see Figure 4). Because of
the assumed prepositioning of surface cargo, there is an opportunity to deploy these
rovers independently from the large surface habitat (but during the same atmospheric
entry event) to sites that are distant from the habitat landing site. In this situation,
there will be up to two years available for these rovers to carry out long distances
traverses, guided from Earth-based operators, with an ultimate destination of the
habitat landing site. After the crew arrives at the habitat, these robotic rovers can be
deployed on other traverses under the guidance of the surface crew.
A group of scientists familiar with the goals and objectives likely to be
established for future human missions to the Moon and Mars was assembled by the
Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (a standing NASA working group often
asked to address these types of questions). This group, named the Human
Exploration of Mars Science Analysis Group, considered these three approaches and
indicated a preference for the “commuter” option, although none of the approaches
could be completely ruled out.
One approach to accomplishing the desired long traverses under this
“commuter” scenario will be to use the pressurized rovers (or possibly robotic rovers)
to prepositioning supplies in caches along the proposed route of travel prior to the
“full duration” traverse. Thus a typical traverse will begin with the crew (or robotic
rovers) traveling out a nominal distance (approximately 15 kilometers, or EVA walk-
back distance) and establishing a cache of commodities for life support and power
(possibly emergency habitation) before returning to the habitat. Some amount of
exploration-related activities may be accomplished during this cache deployment
phase but the primary purpose is route reconnaissance and cache establishment. The
crew then makes another traverse, establishing a second cache a like distance beyond
the first cache. This process continues until all caches in this chain are built up
sufficiently for the crew, in the two pressurized rovers, to make the entire round trip
traverse for the time duration needed to accomplish traverse objectives. The amount
of time required to set up and retrieve these supply caches will depend on the specific
conditions for a traverse. However, the timeline in Figure 5 illustrates how much can
be accomplished if approximately two weeks are allocated for establishing this string
of caches and another two weeks to retrieve them. In addition, not all traverses will
be long enough to require this type of support. A mixture of cache-supported and
unsupported traverses has been illustrated. Finally, some amount of time will be
required to repair and restock the pressurized rovers after each traverse, as well as
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Figure 5. A notional surface exploration timeline to illustrate the number of
traverses and other related activities assuming the use of small pressurized rovers
of limited capability and the use of caches to extend traverse range. (Figure 6-5
from Drake, 2009b, p 253. Figure prepared by the author for the referenced report.
Used with permission.)
conduct any local experiments and plan for the next traverse. A notional two weeks
between short traverses and four weeks between long traverses has been illustrated in
Figure 5.
Workshop Summary
The workshop was divided into two parts covering two full days. On the first
day eight invited presentations were made to those attending. The second day
consisted of several smaller focus meetings with specialized groups (e.g., surface
rovers, EVA suits, habitats, traverse planning, etc.) to provide an opportunity for
continued discussions based on the first day’s presentations.
Fifty people, including the invited speakers, attended the first day’s
presentations. These attendees represented six different NASA Centers and several
contractors or universities. The presentations consisted of: (1) Dr. Charles
Swithinbank (Scott Polar Research Institute) discussing observations from the
Norwegian- British- Swedish Expedition (NBSX) of 1949-52 and the evolution that
followed, (2) Dr. Charles Bentley (University of Wisconsin) discussing the first of
two perspectives on the International Geophysical Year and the evolution that
followed, (3) Dr. Richard Cameron discussing the second of two perspectives on the
International Geophysical Year and the evolution that followed, (4) Dr. Friedrich
Horz and Dr. Gary Lofgren (NASA Johnson Space Center) discussing the Apollo
lunar traverses and the associated planning along with contemporary field tests of
NASA equipment and procedures, (5) Dr. Marie-Claude Williamson (Canadian Space
Agency) discussing contemporary science traverses in the Arctic, (6) Dr. Mary Albert
(Dartmouth College) discussing contemporary science traverses in the Antarctic, (7)
Mr. John Gruener (NASA Johnson Space Center) discussing NASA’s plans for
potential traverses on the lunar surface in the next era, and (8) Mr. Johan Berte
(International Polar Foundation) providing an overview of the Belgian Princess
Elizabeth Antarctica research station and its development.
Three short summaries of these polar expeditions and their traverse
experience, spanning from the very earliest to the most recent, are discussed in the
next several sections. These brief summaries are provided to illustrate what was
accomplished by these teams as well as providing a means to compare these activities
with the proposed Mars surface exploration approaches discussed previously.
Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1949-52
The Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1949-52 began with
Swedish scientists seeking to investigate some pre-World War II photographic data
that appeared to indicate significant glacial retreat in this area (there were concerns
about climate change even at this time). Unable to finance the entire expedition,
Swedish scientists expanded the effort to include colleagues from Norway and
England with similar interests (and additional finances; see Giaever, 1954 and
Swithinbank, 1999 for additional details). With the addition of Norwegian and British
scientists, objectives for the expedition also expanded to include a general survey of
this region of Antarctica, which was largely unexplored at the time. This expedition
spent two consecutive years completing these objectives, which included a wide
range of scientific investigations in the fields of geology, glaciology, meteorology
and medicine. In addition, the crew conducted significant topographical surveys and
mapping of the local region. Norway was mainly responsible for meteorology and
topographical surveys, Britain for geology and Sweden for glaciology. The
expedition team totaled 15 men -- eight scientists (two glaciologists, two
meteorologists, two geologists, a geophysicist and a topographical surveyor) and
seven support personnel.
This group used much of its first Austral summer to find a suitable location
near the coast of Dronning Maud Land -- an area lying between the meridians of
20°W and 45°E -- where they could establish a base camp. Small aircraft were used
to cover more of the coast line in a shorter period of time. Even with this assistance,
it took the team until early February (late in the austral summer) to find a location
along the ice front where their cargo ship could unload. Several huts, for
accommodation and housing of research and communication equipment, were
assembled at this base camp (christened Maudheim, located at 71°03'S, 10°55'W)
along with some 450 tonnes of supplies, sufficient for a stay of up to three years (to
protect against the possibility of pack ice preventing the ship from reaching them at
the appointed time). Another substantial camp -- Advance Base -- was sited at
72°17'S, 03°48'W (approximately 320 kilometers from Maudheim), close to a
nunatak named the "Pyramid". This camp was not permanently occupied, but
consisted of tents, stocks of food and fuel available to support field parties. This team
also established a network of expedition-support supply depots away from Maudheim
and Advance Base to allow field parties to explore for extended times and at extended
ranges from either camp.
Surface traverses were conducted by means of either dog teams pulling
sledges (62 dogs were part of this expedition) or by using some number of the three
tracked amphibious vehicles (the “Weasel”, a small tracked vehicle developed for
military use during World War II, capable of transporting several people or pulling up
to three tonnes of payload). Most of the reconnaissance traverses were conducted by
small (two or three man) teams using dog sledges and skis. One of these teams
remained in the field for six months before returning to Maudheim. The Weasels
were used primarily to haul heavy loads, such as the short (three kilometer) trip
between the supply ship and Maudheim or the long (300 kilometers) trip between
Maudheim and Advanced Base. During the 1951/52 Austral summer, two Weasels
and a habitable trailer constructed on site, were used for an 80 day, 1300 kilometer
traverse to conduct the longest traverse carried out by this team: a seismic survey
originating from Advanced Base (see figure 6).
South Pole Queen Maud Land Traverses (SPQMLT)
Between 1964/65 and 1967/68, a reconnaissance traverse was carried out by
the USAP to support geophysical and glaciological studies from the South Pole to a
point roughly in the center of the Queen Maud Land region (specifically at 78.70S,
6.87E). Due in part to the distances involved, this reconnaissance was split over three
separate Austral summer seasons: 1964/65, 1965/66, and 1967/68. Scientist on these
traverses gathered geophysical measurements (gravity, magnetics, ice thickness),
glaciological measurements (ice density, surface hardness, surface features, and a
variety of firn measurements), and daily meteorological observations.
During each of these three traverses, the traverse team consisted of eight
scientists and two or three “traverse engineers”. Three large, special-built Tucker
Sno-Cats (two Model 843s and one Model 743) were used for transportation. Two of
these Sno-Cats were configured as habitats (the Model 843s; see Figure 7); one was
configured as a flat bed and was used as the platform for the ice coring drill (the
Model 743). These three Sno-Cats pulled various combinations of three one-ton
sleds, three two-ton Maudheim sleds, two Rolligon trailers (a trailer with large
inflatable tires in which was carried a portion of the fuel for the Sno-Cats). One of
these Sno-Cats towing the Rolligon and two other sleds is sown in Figure 7. A
typical load on these sleds and trailers was approximately 40,000 pounds (18 metric
tons) of supplies, including about 12,000 pounds of fuel, 2,000 pounds of food and
2,000 pounds of explosives. But even with this payload the traverse party required
anywhere from one to three airdrops of fuel and supplies.
The first Queen Maud Land Traverse (QMLT I) began at the South Pole (all
three Tucker Sno-Cats, sleds, trailers and supplies were flow to the South Pole in Air
Force C-130 aircraft) on Dec 4, 1965 and traveled for 54 days to the Pole of
Inaccessibility (82.11 S, 55.03E; the geographical point farthest from any Antarctic
coast line); a total distance of 1524 kilometers. QMLT II began with the 11 person
crew being flown by C-130 to the equipment stored at the Pole of Inaccessibility on
November 22, 1965. After just over three weeks spent working on the Sno-Cats, this
team left the Pole of Inaccessibility on December 15, 1965 and traveled for 45 days to
the U.S. Plateau Station, a total distance of 1343 kilometers. The final team of 10
people left Plateau Station on December 5, 1967 and travels to a point deep in the
Queen Maud Land region (78.70S, 6.87E), a distance of 1556 kilometers. The crew
and equipment was loaded on C-130 aircraft and flown back to McMurdo Station.
This series of overland traverses ended, in part, due to the success of aerial mapping
of the surface (using a variety of sensors) and subsurface (including measuring ice
sheet thickness using airborne radar).
These three crews covered a total distance of 4420 kilometers over a total of
152 days, an average of almost 30 kilometers per day. However the actual moving
rate would have been faster given that these teams made stops along these traverses to
drill ice core, dig snow pits and set off explosive charges to gather seismic data and
determine ice depth.
Norwegian-American Scientific Traverse of East Antarctica 2007-2009
As the name implies, this traverse was a joint effort by U.S. and Norwegian
scientists (although there was membership from other countries as well) that was
carried out as part of the International Polar Year (IPY). As with the earlier
Norwegian-British-Swedish Expedition discussed earlier, neither of these sponsoring
groups had sufficient resources to carry out this traverse on their own, but they were
able to jointly assemble a team and supporting resources for this important IPY
traverse. The overall objective of this traverse was to gather data from the East
Antarctic ice sheet from a variety of sources to be used to study the current and past
role of this ice sheet in the Earth’s climate. This included comparing data sets with
those gathered approximately 40 years earlier during the Queen Maud Land Traverse
discussed above. The specific science data sets to be gathered by this team included
physical, chemical and electrical property analyses of ice laid down at over time
(obtained from ice cores) and stratigraphic measurements from recent years (obtained
from snow pits). The team also gathered radar data and related it to satellite
(particularly Synthetic Aperture Radar or SAR) images. The radar measurements
allowed the team to connect data from the snow pits and core samples, as well as
mapping near those sites, to the longer traverse.
The traverse team totaled 12 people – seven scientists and five support
personnel. This team used the Swedish-built Berco TL-6 “Snow Cat” as its primary
means of transportation. Four of these Snow Cats used for the traverse, each vehicle
pulling two large (and occasionally a small) sledge. The configuration of these four
vehicle/sledge combinations is shown in Figure 8. Prepositioned supply depots
(primarily fuel) were used to resupply these vehicles, on both the south bound (three
depots) and north bound (two depots, including South Pole Station) traverses.
Figure 9 shows the traverse route followed by this team from the Norwegian
station (Troll) to the South Pole (dark blue in this image with science stations
indicated) and the
	
LIVING MODSILE^	 ^,! ! -! -! .! -! -! ! ! .! -^ 	! ! .! -!	 return	 route	 (light
I	 .., a"`'"rY	
r : l . . ...... .. .. . . .. .. y` , , , .,	 green in this image).
	
- ' `s	 The route from Troll
r ^	 • • r	 ^^` r	 to the South Pole was
I	 completed during the
2007-2008	 Austral
I	 _111• •	 • •••	 summer and covered
a distance of 2676
(	 -	 kilometers in 59 days
	
i. ....^ . ,. • "	 ^..	 ^•	 • • • . • • '	 ' " ''	 (an average of 45
_	 x,.TOa , .,	 ►, ^ , , , , , , , , , , ' ,^ ^" ! ! .! .! ! 	 kilometers/day).
Note: due to recurring
J	 ^^	 '^^' •^` •,•^•	 mechanical problemsFigure 8. Vehicle configuration for the Norwegian- 	 with the traverseAmerican Scientific Traverse of East Antarctica. Colors 	 vehicles, this team
code: red = vehicles and modules, yellow = fuel, 	 actually stopped justgrey/white = equipment. (Image courtesy of Mary Albert) short of the South
Pole and was flown the remaining distance. The following season, the traverse team
made significant repairs to their vehicles before continuing on to the South Pole and
then returning to Troll by a different route. The route from South Pole to Troll was
completed during the 2008-2009 Austral summer and covered a distance of 2166
kilometers in 62 days (an average of 34 kilometers/day).
Workshop Results
There are several conclusions and observations that can be drawn from this
workshop: those that are immediately obvious, those that can be developed in the near
future and those that will require additional effort to realize.
In this first category, there were several points where NASA plans and the
experience of this polar exploration community were similar as well as some
important differences.
a) The current approach assumed in the Mars Design Reference Mission for
using supply depots along the path of a traverse is consistent with long-
standing practice in the polar regions, particularly where air resupply is not
available (and there is currently no functional equivalent to airborne resupply
available to NASA).
b) Crew sizes in the selected examples are larger than current plans for Mars
missions (lunar missions are currently planning on four crew per mission) but
there are other examples of similar crew sizes that have functioned quite well
for long durations. The crews in these selected missions are large enough to
allow for specialization among the members – roughly half scientists and half
support personnel – but all members of the crew are expected to help in some
manner with all tasks needed to successfully complete the traverse.
c) Examples	 of
leadership
responsibilities for
traverses in these
polar regions include
some in which a
scientist has the
primary role, some in
which a non-scientist
(most of the examples
cited involved a
military officer) held
this primary role, and
cases in which this
role was divided
between a senior
scientist and a non
scientist. Examples in
the first and last
categories seemed to
work well; the middle
d)
case can work, but	 ;Cam Winter
there were some	 r'
glaring	 examples	 out Pale	 ,m
where it did not work
well at all. The lesson
in this particular area Figure 9. Traverse route for the Norwegian-US
is that selection of the Science Traverse of East Antarctica. The dark
team leadership is blue line indicates the 2007/08 route south and the
extremely important light green line indicates the 2008/09 route north.
for these long duration Also indicated with a light blue-gold-red line are
missions and for the three QMLT from the mid-1960s. (Map
traverses. This does courtesy of Mary Albert. Used with permission.)
not minimize the
importance of selecting all members of the crew such that they will work
effectively as a team, but the leadership will be most important in maintaining
this cohesiveness and productivity throughout the mission or traverse.
Polar exploration has traditionally sent the scientific principal investigator (PI)
into the field to conduct their research program. NASA has traditionally
trained career crewmembers to be highly skilled at a number of different tasks
and in particular to conduct research for a PI while on a space mission. This
latter approach has worked quite well for NASA over the years, with the
Apollo astronauts cited as well trained field geologists able to work
effectively in these new environments but with the support of a highly trained
“back room” supporting them from Earth. The point was made that due to the
communication lags between Earth and Mars as well as the high potential for
serendipitous discoveries, that NASA should give serious consideration to
modeling crews after the specialization mix seem in polar exploration and
training each of these specialists to be able to carry out many of the tasks on
the mission. The advantage of having these PI scientists built into the crews
from the outset is to use this skill and experience to recognize and take
advantage of those serendipitous events that lead to significant discoveries.
In the second category, namely those items that can be developed in the near
future, several examples are worth mentioning:
a) There was general agreement that there are potential parallels between key
characteristics of the systems used for exploration in these environments, such
as heated volume as an analog for pressurized volume or energy usage for
various activities. NASA will look at these characteristics to identify which
could help with preliminary planning and gather raw data from the presenters
to model these characteristics.
b) There was also a realization that there is great potential for high quality data
relevant to NASA activities that could be derived from past, present and
future exploration the polar regions. However, there is no current requirement
to capture these data and analyze them in any manner useful to NASA
planning for planetary missions. Several of the workshop participants have
taken upon themselves to begin to gather and assess these data. One example
is being discussed at this conference in another paper (Mueller, Hoffman, and
Thur) in which a detailed inventory of material used by the US Antarctic
Program for the South Pole resupply traverses is being generated and
assessed. Preliminary results from this particular effort indicate that 1.25
units of mass for transportation, consumables, crew equipment, etc. is required
to deliver 1.0 units of mass to the South Pole. This result is highly dependent
on the operational approach used to transport these supplies. However it does
provide a useful metric for NASA planners to consider as well as providing
the USAP with a benchmark they can use to gauge improvements in their
resupply approach.
In the third category, those items that will require additional effort to realize,
there were a number of general discussions that occurred primarily on the second day
of the workshop. New technologies are being applied and design approaches are
being tailored to take advantage of these technologies on both side. Interactions
between these two communities has begun or is expanding to understand how these
new technologies are being leveraged: NASA habitation designers are exchanging
ideas and approaches with the Antarctic station designers; Antarctic support
contractors have put together a list of areas where NASA could benefit from their
experience and vice versa; discussions have begun to compare the equipment used for
the NSF South Pole Station resupply traverses to identify possibly functional
similarities for NASA. In one specific case, NASA advances in closing the water
loop portion of a spacecraft life support system was cited as a technology that could
be highly beneficial to the USAP now in that it could help significantly reduce the
amount of energy used to generate fresh water by melting snow and ice.
On the whole participants in this workshop found the experiences discussed
and ideas exchanged to be very useful and should not only be continued, but
expanded. These recommendations have been made to management in both
communities and plans are underway to implement this general recommendation in a
way that will be mutually beneficial.
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